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`̀ The worst thing one can do with words,'' wrote George Orwell a half
a century ago, ``is to surrender to them.'' If language is to be `̀ an
instrument for expressing and not for concealing or preventing
thought,'' he continued, one must `̀ let the meaning choose the word,
and not the other way about.''1 The argument of this article is that
the social sciences and humanities have surrendered to the word
`̀ identity''; that this has both intellectual and political costs; and that
we can do better. `̀ Identity,'' we argue, tends to mean too much (when
understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak
sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity).We take stock
of the conceptual and theoretical work `̀ identity'' is supposed to do and
suggest that this work might be done better by other terms, less ambig-
uous, and unencumbered by the reifying connotations of `̀ identity.''
We argue that the prevailing constructivist stance on identity ^ the
attempt to ``soften'' the term, to acquit it of the charge of ``essentialism''
by stipulating that identities are constructed, £uid, and multiple ^
leaves us without a rationale for talking about ``identities'' at all and
ill-equipped to examine the `̀ hard'' dynamics and essentialist claims of
contemporary identity politics. `̀ Soft'' constructivism allows putative
`̀ identities'' to proliferate. But as they proliferate, the term loses its
analytical purchase. If identity is everywhere, it is nowhere. If it is
£uid, how can we understand the ways in which self-understandings
may harden, congeal, and crystallize? If it is constructed, how can we
understand the sometimes coercive force of external identi¢cations? If
it is multiple, how do we understand the terrible singularity that is
often striven for ^ and sometimes realized ^ by politicians seeking to
transform mere categories into unitary and exclusive groups? How can
we understand the power and pathos of identity politics?
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`̀ Identity'' is a key term in the vernacular idiom of contemporary
politics, and social analysis must take account of this fact. But this
does not require us to use ``identity'' as a category of analysis or to
conceptualize `̀ identities'' as something that all people have, seek, con-
struct, and negotiate. Conceptualizing all a¤nities and a¤liations, all
forms of belonging, all experiences of commonality, connectedness, and
cohesion, all self-understandings and self-identi¢cations in the idiom of
`̀ identity'' saddles us with a blunt, £at, undi¡erentiated vocabulary.
We do not aim here to contribute to the ongoing debate on identity
politics.2 We focus instead on identity as an analytical category. This
is not a ``merely semantic'' or terminological issue. The use and abuse
of ``identity,'' we suggest, a¡ects not only the language of social anal-
ysis but also ^ inseparably ^ its substance. Social analysis ^ including
the analysis of identity politics ^ requires relatively unambiguous ana-
lytical categories. Whatever its suggestiveness, whatever its indispens-
ability in certain practical contexts, `̀ identity'' is too ambiguous, too
torn between `̀ hard'' and ``soft'' meanings, essentialist connotations and
constructivist quali¢ers, to serve well the demands of social analysis.
The ``identity'' crisis in the social sciences
`̀ Identity'' and cognate terms in other languages have a long history as
technical terms in Western philosophy, from the ancient Greeks
through contemporary analytical philosophy. They have been used to
address the perennial philosophical problems of permanence amidst
manifest change, and of unity amidst manifest diversity.3 Widespread
vernacular and social-analytical use of ``identity'' and its cognates,
however, is of much more recent vintage and more localized prove-
nance.
The introduction of `̀ identity'' into social analysis and its initial di¡u-
sion in the social sciences and public discourse occurred in the United
States in the 1960s (with some anticipations in the second half of the
1950s).4 The most important and best-known trajectory involved the
appropriation and popularization of the work of Erik Erikson (who
was responsible, among other things, for coining the term `̀ identity
crisis'').5 But as Philip Gleason has shown,6 there were other paths
of di¡usion as well. The notion of identi¢cation was pried from its
original, speci¢cally psychoanalytic context (where the term had been
initially introduced by Freud) and linked to ethnicity on the one hand
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(through Gordon Allport's in£uential 1954 book The Nature of Preju-
dice) and to sociological role theory and reference group theory on the
other (through ¢gures such as Nelson Foote and Robert Merton).
Symbolic interactionist sociology, concerned from the outset with ``the
self,'' came increasingly to speak of `̀ identity,'' in part through the
in£uence of Anselm Strauss.7 More in£uential in popularizing the
notion of identity, however, were Erving Go¡man, working on the
periphery of the symbolic interactionist tradition, and Peter Berger,
working in social constructionist and phenomenological traditions.8
For a variety of reasons, the term identity proved highly resonant in the
1960s,9 di¡using quickly across disciplinary and national boundaries,
establishing itself in the journalistic as well as the academic lexicon,
and permeating the language of social and political practice as well
as that of social and political analysis. In the American context, the
prevalent individualist ethos and idiom gave a particular salience and
resonance to ``identity'' concerns, particularly in the contexts of the
1950s thematization of the `̀ mass society'' problem and the 1960s gen-
erational rebellions. And from the late 1960s on, with the rise of the
Black Power movement, and subsequently other ethnic movements
for which it served as a template, concerns with and assertions of
individual identity, already linked by Erikson to ``communal cul-
ture,''10 were readily, if facilely, transposed to the group level. The
proliferation of identitarian claim-making was facilitated by the com-
parative institutional weakness of leftist politics in the United States
and by the concomitant weakness of class-based idioms of social and
political analysis. As numerous analysts have observed, class can itself
be understood as an identity.11 Our point here is simply that the weak-
ness of class politics in the United States (vis-a© -vis Western Europe)
left the ¢eld particularly wide open for the profusion of identity claims.
Already in the mid-1970s,W. J.M. Mackenzie could characterize iden-
tity as a word ``driven out of its wits by over-use,'' and Robert Coles
could remark that the notions of identity and identity crisis had become
`̀ the purest of clichës.''2 But that was only the beginning. In the 1980s,
with the rise of race, class, and gender as the ``holy trinity'' of literary
criticism and cultural studies,13 the humanities joined the fray in full
force. And `̀ identity talk'' ^ inside and outside academia ^ continues
to proliferate today.14 The `̀ identity'' crisis ^ a crisis of overproduction
and consequent devaluation of meaning ^ shows no sign of abating.15
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Qualitative as well as quantitative indicators signal the centrality ^
indeed the inescapability ^ of `̀ identity'' as a topos. In recent years, two
new interdisciplinary journals devoted to the subject, complete with
star-studded editorial boards, have been launched.16 And quite apart
from the pervasive concern with `̀ identity'' in work on gender, sexuality,
race, religion, ethnicity, nationalism, immigration, new social move-
ments, culture, and ``identity politics,'' even those whose work has not
been concerned primarily with these topics have felt obliged to address
the question of identity. A selective listing of major social theorists and
social scientists whose main work lies outside the traditional ``home-
lands'' of identity theorizing yet who have nonetheless written explic-
itly on `̀ identity'' in recent years includes Zygmunt Bauman, Pierre
Bourdieu, Fernand Braudel, Craig Calhoun, S. N. Eisenstadt, Anthony
Giddens, Bernhard Giesen, Ju« rgen Habermas, David Laitin, Claude
Lëvi-Strauss, Paul Ricoeur, Amartya Sen, Margaret Somers, Charles
Taylor, Charles Tilly, and HarrisonWhite.17
Categories of practice and categories of analysis
Many key terms in the interpretative social sciences and history ^
`̀ race,'' ``nation,'' ``ethnicity,'' ``citizenship,'' `̀ democracy,'' ``class,''
`̀ community,'' and `̀ tradition,'' for example ^ are at once categories
of social and political practice and categories of social and political
analysis. By `̀ categories of practice,'' following Bourdieu, we mean
something akin to what others have called `̀ native'' or `̀ folk'' or ``lay''
categories. These are categories of everyday social experience, devel-
oped and deployed by ordinary social actors, as distinguished from
the experience-distant categories used by social analysts.18 We prefer
the expression ``category of practice'' to the alternatives, for while the
latter imply a relatively sharp distinction between ``native'' or `̀ folk'' or
`̀ lay'' categories on the one hand and `̀ scienti¢c'' categories on the
other, such concepts as `̀ race,'' `̀ ethnicity,'' or ``nation'' are marked by
close reciprocal connection and mutual in£uence among their practi-
cal and analytical uses.19
`̀ Identity,'' too, is both a category of practice and a category of analy-
sis. As a category of practice, it is used by `̀ lay'' actors in some (not
all!) everyday settings to make sense of themselves, of their activities,
of what they share with, and how they di¡er from, others. It is also
used by political entrepreneurs to persuade people to understand
themselves, their interests, and their predicaments in a certain way, to
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persuade certain people that they are (for certain purposes) `̀ identical''
with one another and at the same time di¡erent from others, and to
organize and justify collective action along certain lines.20 In these
ways the term `̀ identity'' is implicated both in everyday life and in
`̀ identity politics'' in its various forms.
Everyday `̀ identity talk'' and ``identity politics'' are real and important
phenomena. But the contemporary salience of ``identity'' as a category
of practice does not require its use as a category of analysis. Consider
an analogy. `̀ Nation'' is a widely used category of social and political
practice. Appeals and claims made in the name of putative `̀ nations''
^ for example, claims to self-determination ^ have been central to
politics for a hundred-and-¢fty years. But one does not have to use
`̀ nation'' as an analytical category to understand and analyze such
appeals and claims. One does not have to take a category inherent in
the practice of nationalism ^ the realist, reifying conception of nations
as real communities ^ and make this category central to the theory of
nationalism.21Nor does one have to use `̀ race'' as a category of analysis
^ which risks taking for granted that `̀ race'' exists ^ to understand and
analyze social and political practices oriented to the presumed exis-
tence of putative `̀ races.''22 Just as one can analyze ``nation-talk'' and
nationalist politics without positing the existence of `̀ nations,'' or
`̀ race-talk'' and `̀ race''-oriented politics without positing the existence
of `̀ races,'' so one can analyze ``identity-talk'' and identity politics
without, as analysts, positing the existence of ``identities.''
Rei¢cation is a social process, not only an intellectual practice. As
such, it is central to the politics of `̀ ethnicity,'' `̀ race,'' ``nation,'' and
other putative `̀ identities.''Analysts of this kind of politics should seek
to account for this process of rei¢cation.We should seek to explain the
processes and mechanisms through which what has been called the
`̀ political ¢ction'' of the `̀ nation'' ^ or of the ``ethnic group,'' `̀ race,'' or
other putative `̀ identity'' ^ can crystallize, at certain moments, as a
powerful, compelling reality.23 But we should avoid unintentionally
reproducing or reinforcing such rei¢cation by uncritically adopting
categories of practice as categories of analysis.
The mere use of a term as a category of practice, to be sure, does not
disqualify it as a category of analysis.24 If it did, the vocabulary of
social analysis would be a great deal poorer, and more arti¢cial, than it
is.What is problematic is not that a particular term is used, but how it
is used. The problem, as Lo|« c Wacquant has argued with respect to
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`̀ race,'' lies in the `̀ uncontrolled con£ation of social and sociological . . .
[or] folk and analytic understandings.''25 The problem is that `̀ nation,''
`̀ race,'' and `̀ identity'' are used analytically a good deal of the time
more or less as they are used in practice, in an implicitly or explicitly
reifying manner, in a manner that implies or asserts that ``nations,''
`̀ races,'' and `̀ identities'' `̀ exist'' and that people ``have'' a ``nationality,''
a `̀ race,'' an `̀ identity.''
It may be objected that this overlooks recent e¡orts to avoid reifying
`̀ identity'' by theorizing identities as multiple, fragmented, and £uid.26
`̀ Essentialism'' has indeed been vigorously criticized, and constructi-
vist gestures now accompany most discussions of `̀ identity.''27 Yet we
often ¢nd an uneasy amalgam of constructivist language and essentialist
argumentation.28 This is not a matter of intellectual sloppiness. Rather,
it re£ects the dual orientation of many academic identitarians as both
analysts and protagonists of identity politics. It re£ects the tension
between the constructivist language that is required by academic cor-
rectness and the foundationalist or essentialist message that is required
if appeals to `̀ identity'' are to be e¡ective in practice.29 Nor is the
solution to be found in a more consistent constructivism: for it is not
clear why what is routinely characterized as multiple, fragmented, and
£uid should be conceptualized as `̀ identity'' at all.
The uses of ``identity''
What do scholars mean when they talk about ``identity?''30 What
conceptual and explanatory work is the term supposed to do? This
depends on the context of its use and the theoretical tradition from
which the use in question derives. The term is richly ^ indeed for an
analytical concept, hopelessly ^ ambiguous. But one can identify a few
key uses:
1. Understood as a ground or basis of social or political action, `̀ iden-
tity'' is often opposed to `̀ interest'' in an e¡ort to highlight and
conceptualize non-instrumental modes of social and political ac-
tion.31 With a slightly di¡erent analytical emphasis, it is used to
underscore the manner in which action ^ individual or collective ^
may be governed by particularistic self-understandings rather than
by putatively universal self-interest.32 This is probably the most
general use of the term; it is frequently found in combination with
other uses. It involves three related but distinct contrasts in ways of
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conceptualizing and explaining action. The ¢rst is between self-
understanding and (narrowly understood) self-interest.33 The second
is between particularity and (putative) universality. The third is
between two ways of construing social location. Many (though not
all) strands of identitarian theorizing see social and political action
as powerfully shaped by position in social space.34 In this they agree
with many (though not all) strands of universalist, instrumentalist
theorizing. But `̀ social location'' means something quite di¡erent
in the two cases. For identitarian theorizing, it means position in
a multidimensional space de¢ned by particularistic categorical at-
tributes (race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation). For instrumen-
talist theorizing, it means position in a universalistically conceived
social structure (for example, position in the market, the occupa-
tional structure, or the mode of production).35
2. Understood as a speci¢cally collective phenomenon, ``identity'' de-
notes a fundamental and consequential sameness among members
of a group or category. This may be understood objectively (as a
sameness `̀ in itself'') or subjectively (as an experienced, felt, or
perceived sameness). This sameness is expected to manifest itself in
solidarity, in shared dispositions or consciousness, or in collective
action. This usage is found especially in the literature on social
movements;36 on gender;37 and on race, ethnicity, and national-
ism.38 In this usage, the line between `̀ identity'' as a category of
analysis and as a category of practice is often blurred.
3. Understood as a core aspect of (individual or collective) `̀ selfhood''
or as a fundamental condition of social being, ``identity'' is invoked
to point to something allegedly deep, basic, abiding, or foundational.
This is distinguished from more super¢cial, accidental, £eeting, or
contingent aspects or attributes of the self, and is understood as
something to be valued, cultivated, supported, recognized, and pre-
served.39 This usage is characteristic of certain strands of the psy-
chological (or psychologizing) literature, especially as in£uenced by
Erikson,40 though it also appears in the literature on race, ethnicity,
and nationalism. Here too the practical and analytical uses of
`̀ identity'' are frequently con£ated.
4. Understood as a product of social or political action, `̀ identity'' is
invoked to highlight the processual, interactive development of the
kind of collective self-understanding, solidarity, or ``groupness'' that
can make collective action possible. In this usage, found in certain
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strands of the `̀ new social movement'' literature, `̀ identity'' is under-
stood both as a contingent product of social or political action and
as a ground or basis of further action.41
5. Understood as the evanescent product of multiple and competing
discourses, ``identity'' is invoked to highlight the unstable, multiple,
£uctuating, and fragmented nature of the contemporary `̀ self.'' This
usage is found especially in the literature in£uenced by Foucault,
post-structuralism, and post-modernism.42 In somewhat di¡erent
form, without the post-structuralist trappings, it is also found in
certain strands of the literature on ethnicity ^ notably in `̀ situa-
tionalist'' or `̀ contextualist'' accounts of ethnicity.43
Clearly, the term ``identity'' is made to do a great deal of work. It is
used to highlight non-instrumental modes of action; to focus on self-
understanding rather than self-interest; to designate sameness across
persons or sameness over time; to capture allegedly core, foundational
aspects of selfhood; to deny that such core, foundational aspects exist;
to highlight the processual, interactive development of solidarity and
collective self-understanding; and to stress the fragmented quality of
the contemporary experience of `̀ self,'' a self unstably patched together
through shards of discourse and contingently ``activated'' in di¡ering
contexts.
These usages are not simply heterogeneous; they point in sharply
di¡ering directions. To be sure, there are a¤nities between certain of
them, notably between the second and third, and between the fourth
and ¢fth. And the ¢rst usage is general enough to be compatible with
all of the others. But there are strong tensions as well. The second and
third uses both highlight fundamental sameness ^ sameness across
persons and sameness over time ^ while the fourth and ¢fth uses both
reject notions of fundamental or abiding sameness.
`̀ Identity,'' then, bears a multivalent, even contradictory theoretical
burden. Do we really need this heavily burdened, deeply ambiguous
term? The overwhelming weight of scholarly opinion suggests that we
do.44 Even the most sophisticated theorists, while readily acknowl-
edging the elusive and problematic nature of ``identity,'' have argued
that it remains indispensable. Critical discussion of `̀ identity'' has thus
sought not to jettison but to save the term by reformulating it so as to
make it immune from cetain objections, especially from the dreaded
charge of `̀ essentialism.'' Thus Stuart Hall characterizes identity as ``an
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idea which cannot be thought in the old way, but without which certain
key questions cannot be thought at all.''45 What these key questions
are, and why they cannot be addressed without ``identity,'' remain
obscure in Hall's sophisticated but opaque discussion.46 Hall's comment
echoes an earlier formulation of Claude Lëvi-Strauss, characterizing
identity is `̀ a sort of virtual center (foyer virtuel) to which we must refer
to explain certain things, but without it ever having a real existence.''47
Lawrence Grossberg, concerned by the narrowing preoccupation of
cultural studies with the `̀ theory and politics of identity,'' nonetheless
repeatedly assures the reader that he does `̀ not mean to reject the
concept of identity or its political importance in certain struggles'' and
that his `̀ project is not to escape the discourse of identity but to
relocate it, to rearticulate it.''48 Alberto Melucci, a leading exponent
of identity-oriented analyses of social movements, acknowledges that
`̀ the word identity . . . is semantically inseparable from the idea of
permanence and is perhaps, for this very reason, ill-suited to the
processual analysis for which I am arguing.''49 Ill-suited or not, `̀ iden-
tity'' continues to ¢nd a central place in Melucci's writing.
We are not persuaded that ``identity'' is indispensable.We sketch below
some alternative analytical idioms that can do the necessary work
without the attendant confusion. Su¤ce it to say for the moment that
if one wants to argue that particularistic self-understandings shape
social and political action in a non-instrumental manner, one can
simply say so. If one wants to trace the process through which persons
sharing some categorical attribute come to share de¢nitions of their
predicament, understandings of their interest, and a readiness to under-
take collective action, it is best to do so in a manner that highlights the
contingent and variable relationship between mere categories and
bounded, solidary groups. If one wants to examine the meanings and
signi¢cance people give to constructs such as `̀ race,'' ``ethnicity,'' and
`̀ nationality,'' one already has to thread through conceptual thickets,
and it is not clear what one gains by aggregating them under the £at-
tening rubric of identity. And if one wants to convey the late modern
sense of a self being constructed and continuously reconstructed out of
a variety of competing discourses ^ and remaining fragile, £uctuating,
and fragmented ^ it is not obvious why the word identity captures the
meaning being conveyed.
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``Strong'' and ``weak'' understandings of ``identity''
We suggested at the outset that `̀ identity'' tends to mean either too
much or too little. This point can now be elaborated. Our inventory
of the uses of `̀ identity'' has revealed not only great heterogeneity but
a strong antithesis between positions that highlight fundamental or
abiding sameness and stances that expressly reject notions of basic
sameness. The former can be called strong or hard conceptions of
identity, the latter weak or soft conceptions.
Strong conceptions of `̀ identity'' preserve the common-sense meaning
of the term ^ the emphasis on sameness over time or across persons.
And they accord well with the way the term is used in most forms of
identity politics. But precisely because they adopt for analytical pur-
poses a category of everyday experience and political practice, they
entail a series of deeply problematic assumptions:
1. Identity is something all people have, or ought to have, or are
searching for.
2. Identity is something all groups (at least groups of a certain kind ^
e.g., ethnic, racial, or national) have, or ought to have.
3. Identity is something people (and groups) can have without being
aware of it. In this perspective, identity is something to be discovered,
and something about which one can be mistaken. The strong con-
ception of identity thus replicates the Marxian epistemology of class.
4. Strong notions of collective identity imply strong notions of group
boundedness and homogeneity. They imply high degrees of group-
ness, an ``identity'' or sameness among group members, a sharp
distinctiveness from nonmembers, a clear boundary between inside
and outside.50
Given the powerful challenges from many quarters to substantialist
understandings of groups and essentialist understandings of identity,
one might think we have sketched a ``straw man'' here. Yet in fact
strong conceptions of ``identity'' continue to inform important strands
of the literature on gender, race, ethnicity, and nationalism.51
Weak understandings of `̀ identity,'' by contrast, break consciously
with the everyday meaning of the term. It is such weak or ``soft''
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conceptions that have been heavily favored in theoretical discussions
of ``identity'' in recent years, as theorists have become increasingly
aware of and uncomfortable with the strong or `̀ hard'' implications of
everyday meanings of `̀ identity.'' Yet this new theoretical ``common
sense'' has problems of its own.We sketch three of these.
The ¢rst is what we call `̀ clichëd constructivism.'' Weak or soft con-
ceptions of identity are routinely packaged with standard quali¢ers
indicating that identity is multiple, unstable, in £ux, contingent, frag-
mented, constructed, negotiated, and so on. These quali¢ers have
become so familiar ^ indeed obligatory ^ in recent years that one
reads (and writes) them virtually automatically. They risk becoming
mere place-holders, gestures signaling a stance rather than words con-
veying a meaning.
Second, it is not clear why weak conceptions of `̀ identity'' are concep-
tions of identity. The everyday sense of ``identity'' strongly suggests at
least some self-sameness over time, some persistence, something that
remains identical, the same, while other things are changing. What is
the point in using the term ``identity'' if this core meaning is expressly
repudiated?
Third, and most important, weak conceptions of identity may be too
weak to do useful theoretical work. In their concern to cleanse the
term of its theoretically disreputable `̀ hard'' connotations, in their
insistence that identities are multiple, malleable, £uid, and so on, soft
identitarians leave us with a term so in¢nitely elastic as to be incapable
of performing serious analytical work.
We are not claiming that the strong and weak versions sketched here
jointly exhaust the possible meanings and uses of `̀ identity.'' Nor are
we claiming that sophisticated constructivist theorists have not done
interesting and important work using `̀ soft'' understandings of iden-
tity. We argue, however, that what is interesting and important in this
work often does not depend on the use of `̀ identity'' as an analytical
category. Consider three examples.
Margaret Somers, criticizing scholarly discussions of identity for focus-
ing on categorical commonality rather than on historically variable
relational embeddedness, proposes to ``recon¢gur[e] the study of iden-
tity formation through the concept of narrative,'' to ``incorporate into
the core conception of identity the categorically destabilizing dimen-
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sions of time, space, and relationality.'' Somers makes a compelling
case for the importance of narrative to social life and social analysis,
and argues persuasively for situating social narratives in historically
speci¢c relational settings. She focuses on the ontological dimension of
narratives, on the way in which narratives not only represent but, in an
important sense, constitute social actors and the social world in which
they act.What remains unclear from her account is why ^ and in what
sense ^ it is identities that are constituted through narratives and
formed in particular relational settings. Social life is indeed pervasively
`̀ storied''; but it is not clear why this ``storiedness'' should be axiomati-
cally linked to identity. People everywhere and always tell stories about
themselves and others, and locate themselves within culturally avail-
able repertoires of stories. But in what sense does it follow that such
`̀ narrative location endows social actors with identities ^ however
multiple, ambiguous, ephemeral, or con£icting they may be?'' What
does this soft, £exible notion of identity add to the argument about
narrativity? The major analytical work in Somers's article is done by
the concept of narrativity, supplemented by that of relational setting;
the work done by the concept of identity is much less clear.52
Introducing a collection on Citizenship, Identity, and Social History,
Charles Tilly characterizes identity as a `̀ blurred but indispensable''
concept and de¢nes it as `̀ an actor's experience of a category, tie, role,
network, group or organization, coupled with a public representation
of that experience; the public representation often takes the form of a
shared story, a narrative.'' But what is the relationship between this
encompassing, open-ended de¢nition and the work Tilly wants the
concept to do? What is gained, analytically, by labeling any experience
and public representaion of any tie, role, network, etc. as an identity?
When it comes to examples, Tilly rounds up the usual suspects: race,
gender, class, job, religious a¤liation, national origin. But it is not
clear what analytical leverage on these phenomena can be provided by
the exceptionally capacious, £exible concept of identity he proposes.
Highlighting ``identity'' in the title of the volume signals an openness
to the cultural turn in the social history and historical sociology of
citizenship; beyond this, it is not clear what work the concept does.
Justly well-known for fashioning sharply focused, ``hard-working'' con-
cepts, Tilly here faces the di¤culty that confronts most social scientists
writing about identity today: that of devising a concept `̀ soft'' and
£exible enough to satisfy the requirements of relational, constructivist
social theory, yet robust enough to have purchase on the phenomena
that cry out for explanation, some of which are quite `̀ hard.''53
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Craig Calhoun uses the Chinese student movement of 1989 as a vehicle
for a subtle and illuminating discussion of the concepts of identity,
interest, and collective action. Calhoun explains students' readiness to
`̀ knowingly risk death'' in Tiananmen Square on the night of June 3,
1989 in terms of an honor-bound identity or sense of self, forged in the
course of the movement itself, to which students became increasingly
and, in the end, irrevocably committed. His account of the shifts in the
students' lived sense of self during the weeks of their protest ^ as they
were drawn, in and through the dynamics of their struggle, from an
originally ``positional,'' class-based self-understanding as students and
intellectuals to a broader, emotionally charged identi¢cation with na-
tional and even universal ideals ^ is a compelling one. Here too, how-
ever, the crucial analytical work appears to be done by a concept other
than identity ^ in this case, that of honor. Honor, Calhoun observes, is
`̀ imperative in a way interests are not.'' But it is also imperative in a
way identity, in the weak sense, is not. Calhoun subsumes honor under
the rubric of identity, and presents his argument as a general one about
the ``constitution and transformation of identity.'' Yet his fundamental
argument in this article, it would seem, is not about identity in general,
but about the way in which a compelling sense of honor can, in extra-
ordinary circumstances, lead people to undertake extraordinary actions,
lest their core sense of self be radically undermined.54
Identity in this exceptionally strong sense ^ as a sense of self that can
imperatively require interest-threatening or even life-threatening action
^ has little to do with identity in the weak or soft sense. Calhoun
himself underscores the incommensurability between ``ordinary identity
^ self-conceptions, the way people reconcile interests in everyday life''
and the imperative, honor-driven sense of self that can enable or even
require people to be `̀ brave to the point of apparent foolishness.''55
Calhoun provides a powerful characterization of the latter; but it is
not clear what analytical work is done by the former, more general
conception of identity.
In his edited volume on Social Theory and the Politics of Identity,
Calhoun works with this more general understanding of identity.
`̀ Concerns with individual and collective identity,'' he observes, ``are
ubiquitous.'' It is certainly true that `̀ [we] know of no people without
names, no languages or cultures in which some manner of distinctions
between self and other, we and they are not made.''56 But it is not clear
why this implies the ubiquity of identity, unless we dilute ``identity'' to
the point of designating all practices involving naming and self-other
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distinctions. Calhoun ^ like Somers and Tilly ^ goes on to make
illuminating arguments on a range of issues concerning claims of
commonality and di¡erence in contemporary social movements. Yet
while such claims are indeed often framed today in an idiom of `̀ iden-
tity,'' it is not clear that adopting that idiom for analytical purposes is
necessary or even helpful.
In other words
What alternative terms might stand in for `̀ identity,'' doing the theo-
retical work `̀ identity'' is supposed to do without its confusing, con-
tradictory connotations? Given the great range and heterogeneity of
the work done by ``identity,'' it would be fruitless to look for a single
substitute, for such a term would be as overburdened as `̀ identity''
itself. Our strategy has been rather to unbundle the thick tangle of
meanings that have accumulated around the term `̀ identity,'' and to
parcel out the work to a number of less congested terms. We sketch
three clusters of terms here.
Identi¢cation and categorization
As a processual, active term, derived from a verb, ``identi¢cation'' lacks
the reifying connotations of `̀ identity.''57 It invites us to specify the
agents that do the identifying. And it does not presuppose that such
identifying (even by powerful agents, such as the state) will necessarily
result in the internal sameness, the distinctiveness, the bounded group-
ness that political entrepreneurs may seek to achieve. Identi¢cation ^
of oneself and of others ^ is intrinsic to social life; `̀ identity'' in the
strong sense is not.
One may be called upon to identify oneself ^ to characterize oneself, to
locate oneself vis-a© -vis known others, to situate oneself in a narrative,
to place oneself in a category ^ in any number of di¡erent contexts.
In modern settings, which multiply interactions with others not per-
sonally known, such occasions for identi¢cation are particularly abun-
dant. They include innumerable situations of everyday life as well as
more formal and o¤cial contexts. How one identi¢es oneself ^ and
how one is identi¢ed by others ^ may vary greatly from context to
context; self- and other-identi¢cation are fundamentally situational
and contextual.
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One key distinction is between relational and categorical modes of
identi¢cation. One may identify oneself (or another person) by posi-
tion in a relational web (a web of kinship, for example, or of friendship,
patron-client ties, or teacher-student relations). On the other hand, one
may identify oneself (or another person) by membership in a class of
persons sharing some categorical attribute (such as race, ethnicity,
language, nationality, citizenship, gender, sexual orientation, etc.).
Craig Calhoun has argued that, while relational modes of identi¢ca-
tion remain important in many contexts even today, categorical identi-
¢cation has assumed ever greater importance in modern settings.58
Another basic distinction is between self-identi¢cation and the identi¢-
cation and categorization of oneself by others.59 Self-identi¢cation takes
place in dialectical interplay with external identi¢cation, and the two
need not converge.60 External identi¢cation is itself a varied process. In
the ordinary ebb and £ow of social life, people identify and categorize
others, just as they identify and categorize themselves. But there is
another key type of external identi¢cation that has no counterpart in the
domain of self-identi¢cation: the formalized, codi¢ed, objecti¢ed sys-
tems of categorization developed by powerful, authoritative institutions.
The modern state has been one of the most important agents of
identi¢cation and categorization in this latter sense. In culturalist
extensions of the Weberian sociology of the state, notably those
in£uenced by Bourdieu and Foucault, the state monopolizes, or seeks
to monopolize, not only legitimate physical force but also legitimate
symbolic force, as Bourdieu puts it. This includes the power to name,
to identify, to categorize, to state what is what and who is who. There is
a burgeoning sociological and historical literature on such subjects.
Some scholars have looked at `̀ identi¢cation'' quite literally: as the
attachment of de¢nitive markers to an individual via passport, ¢nger-
print, photograph, and signature, and the amassing of such identifying
documents in state repositories.When, why, and with what limitations
such systems have been developed turns out to be no simple problem.61
Other scholars emphasize the modern state's e¡orts to inscribe its
subjects onto a classi¢catory grid: to identify and categorize people in
relation to gender, religion, property-ownership, ethnicity, literacy,
criminality, or sanity. Censuses apportion people across these catego-
ries, and institutions ^ from schools to prisons ^ sort out individuals in
relation to them. To Foucauldians in particular, these individualizing
and aggregating modes of identi¢cation and classi¢cation are at the
core of what de¢nes ``governmentality'' in a modern state.62
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The state is thus a powerful `̀ identi¢er,'' not because it can create
`̀ identities'' in the strong sense ^ in general, it cannot ^ but because it
has the material and symbolic resources to impose the categories,
classi¢catory schemes, and modes of social counting and accounting
with which bureaucrats, judges, teachers, and doctors must work and
to which non-state actors must refer.63 But the state is not the only
`̀ identi¢er'' that matters. As Charles Tilly has shown, categorization
does crucial `̀ organizational work'' in all kinds of social settings, in-
cluding families, ¢rms, schools, social movements, and bureaucracies
of all kinds.64 Even the most powerful state does not monopolize the
production and di¡usion of identi¢cations and categories; and those
that it does produce may be contested. The literature on social move-
ments ^ `̀ old'' as well as ``new'' ^ is rich in evidence on how movement
leaders challenge o¤cial identi¢cations and propose alternative ones.65
It highlights leaders' e¡orts to get members of putative constituencies
to identify themselves in a certain way, to see themselves ^ for a certain
range of purposes ^ as ``identical'' with one another, to identify emo-
tionally as well as cognitively with one another.66
The social movement literature has valuably emphasized the interactive,
discursively mediated processes through which collective solidarities
and self-understandings develop. Our reservations concern the move
from discussing the work of identi¢cation ^ the e¡orts to build a collec-
tive self-understanding ^ to positing `̀ identity'' as their necessary result.
By considering authoritative, institutionalized modes of identi¢cation
together with alternative modes involved in the practices of everyday life
and the projects of social movements, one can emphasize the hard work
and long struggles over identi¢cation as well as the uncertain outcomes
of such struggles. However, if the outcome is always presumed to be an
`̀ identity'' ^ however provisional, fragmented, multiple, contested, and
£uid ^ one loses the capacity to make key distinctions.
`̀ Identi¢cation,'' we noted above, invites speci¢cation of the agents
that do the identifying. Yet identi¢cation does not require a speci¢able
`̀ identi¢er''; it can be pervasive and in£uential without being accom-
plished by discrete, speci¢ed persons or institutions. Identi¢cation can
be carried more or less anonymously by discourses or public narra-
tives.67 Although close analysis of such discourses or narratives might
well focus on their instantiations in particular discursive or narrative
utterances, their force may depend not on any particular instantiation
but on their anonymous, unnoticed permeation of our ways of think-
ing and talking and making sense of the social world.
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There is one further meaning of `̀ identi¢cation,'' brie£y alluded to
above, that is largely independent of the cognitive, characterizing,
classi¢catory meanings discussed so far. This is the psychodynamic
meaning, derived originally from Freud.68 While the classi¢catory
meanings involve identifying oneself (or someone else) as someone
who ¢ts a certain description or belongs to a certain category, the
psychodynamic meaning involves identifying oneself emotionally with
another person, category, or collectivity. Here again, `̀ identi¢cation''
calls attention to complex (and often ambivalent) processes, while the
term ``identity,'' designating a condition rather than a process, implies
too easy a ¢t between the individual and the social.
Self-understanding and social location
`̀ Identi¢cation'' and ``categorization'' are active, processual terms, de-
rived from verbs, and calling to mind particular acts of identi¢cation
and categorization performed by particular identi¢ers and categorizers.
But we need other kinds of terms as well to do the varied work done by
`̀ identity.'' Recall that one key use of `̀ identity'' is to conceptualize and
explain action in a non-instrumental, non-mechanial manner. In this
sense, the term suggests ways in which individual and collective action
can be governed by particularistic understandings of self and social
location rather than by putatively universal, structurally determined
interests. `̀ Self-understanding'' is therefore the second term we would
propose as an alternative to `̀ identity.'' It is a dispositional term that
designates what might be called `̀ situated subjectivity'': one's sense of
who one is, of one's social location, and of how (given the ¢rst two) one
is prepared to act. As a dispositional term, it belongs to the realm of
what Pierre Bourdieu has called sens pratique, the practical sense ^ at
once cognitive and emotional ^ that persons have of themselves and
their social world.69
The term ``self-understanding,'' it is important to emphasize, does not
imply a distinctively modern orWestern understanding of the ``self'' as
a homogeneous, bounded, unitary entity. A sense of who one is can
take many forms. The social processes through which persons under-
stand and locate themselves may in some instances involve the psycho-
analyst's couch and in others participation in spirit-possession cults.70
In some settings, people may understand and experience themselves in
terms of a grid of intersecting categories; in others, in terms of a web of
connections of di¡erential proximity and intensity. Hence the impor-
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tance of seeing self-understanding and social locatedness in relation to
each other, and of emphasizing that both the bounded self and the
bounded group are culturally speci¢c rather than universal forms.
Like the term `̀ identi¢cation,'' `̀ self-understanding'' lacks the reifying
connotations of ``identity.'' Yet it is not restricted to situations of £ux
and instability. Self-understandings may be variable across time and
across persons, but they may be stable. Semantically, `̀ identity'' implies
sameness across time or persons; hence the awkwardness of continuing
to speak of ``identity'' while repudiating the implication of sameness.
`̀ Self-understanding,'' by contrast, has no privileged semantic connec-
tion with sameness or di¡erence.
Two closely related terms are `̀ self-representation'' and `̀ self-identi¢ca-
tion.'' Having discussed ``identi¢cation'' above, we simply observe here
that, while the distinction is not sharp, `̀ self-understandings'' may be
tacit; even when they are formed, as they ordinarily are, in and through
prevailing discourses, they may exist, and inform action, without
themselves being discursively articulated. ``Self-representation'' and
`̀ self-identi¢cation,'' on the other hand, suggest at least some degree of
explicit discursive articulation.
`̀ Self-understanding'' cannot, of course, do all the work done by `̀ iden-
tity.'' We note here three limitations of the term. First, it is a subjective,
auto-referential term. As such, it designates one's own understanding
of who one is. It cannot capture others' understandings, even though
external categorizations, identi¢cations, and representations may be
decisive in determining how one is regarded and treated by others,
indeed in shaping one's own understanding of oneself. At the limit,
self-understandings may be overridden by overwhelmingly coercive
external categorizations.71
Second, `̀ self-understanding'' would seem to privilege cognitive aware-
ness. As a result, it would seem not to capture ^ or at least not to
highlight ^ the a¡ective or cathectic processes suggested by some uses
of ``identity.'' Yet self-understanding is never purely cognitive; it is
always a¡ectively tinged or charged, and the term can certainly accom-
modate this a¡ective dimension. However, it is true that the emotional
dynamics are better captured by the term `̀ identi¢cation'' (in its psycho-
dynamic meaning).
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Finally, as a term that emphasizes situated subjectivity, `̀ self-under-
standing'' does not capture the objectivity claimed by strong under-
standings of identity. Strong, objectivist conceptions of identity permit
one to distinguish `̀ true'' identity (characterized as deep, abiding, and
objective) from `̀ mere'' self-understanding (super¢cial, £uctuating,
and subjective). If identity is something to be discovered, and some-
thing about which one can be mistaken, then one's momentary self-
understanding may not correspond to one's abiding, underlying iden-
tity. However analytically problematic these notions of depth, constancy,
and objectivity may be, they do at least provide a reason for using the
language of identity rather than that of self-understanding.
Weak conceptions of identity provide no such reason. It is clear from
the constructivist literature why weak understandings of identity are
weak; but it is not clear why they are conceptions of identity. In this
literature, it is the various soft predicates of identity ^ constructedness,
contingency, instability, multiplicity, £uidity ^ that are emphasized and
elaborated, while what they are predicated of ^ identity itself ^ is taken
for granted and seldom explicated. When identity itself is elucidated,
it is often represented as something ^ a sense of who one is,72 a self-
conception73 ^ that can be captured in a straightforward way by `̀ self-
understanding.'' This term lacks the allure, the buzz, the theoretical
pretensions of `̀ identity,'' but this should count as an asset, not a
liability.
Commonality, connectedness, groupness
One particular form of a¡ectively charged self-understanding that is
often designated by `̀ identity'' ^ especially in discussions of race,
religion, ethnicity, nationalism, gender, sexuality, social movements,
and other phenomena conceptualized as involving collective identities
^ deserves separate mention here. This is the emotionally laden sense
of belonging to a distinctive, bounded group, involving both a felt
solidarity or oneness with fellow group members and a felt di¡erence
from or even antipathy to speci¢ed outsiders.
The problem is that `̀ identity'' is used to designate both such strongly
groupist, exclusive, a¡ectively charged self-understandings and much
looser, more open self-understandings, involving some sense of a¤n-
ity or a¤liation, commonality or connectedness to particular others,
but lacking a sense of overriding oneness vis-a© -vis some constitutive
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`̀ other.''74 Both the tightly groupist and the more loosely a¤liative
forms of self-understanding ^ as well as the transitional forms between
these polar types ^ are important, but they shape personal experience
and condition social and political action in sharply di¡ering ways.
Rather than stirring all self-understandings based on race, religion,
ethnicity, and so on into the great conceptual melting pot of `̀ identity,''
we would do better to use a more di¡erentiated analytical language.
Terms such as commonality, connectedness, and groupness could be
usefully employed here in place of the all-purpose `̀ identity.'' This is the
third cluster of terms we propose. `̀ Commonality'' denotes the sharing
of some common attribute, ``connectedness'' the relational ties that
link people. Neither commonality nor connectedness alone engenders
`̀ groupness'' ^ the sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded, solidary
group. But commonality and connectedness together may indeed do
so. This was the argument Charles Tilly put forward some time ago,
building on Harrison White's idea of the ``catnet,'' a set of persons
comprising both a category, sharing some common attribute, and a
network.75 Tilly's suggestion that groupness is a joint product of the
`̀ catness'' and ``netness'' ^ categorical commonality and relational con-
nectedness ^ is suggestive. But we would propose two emendations.
First, categorical commonality and relational connectedness need to
be supplemented by a third element, what MaxWeber called a Zusam-
mengeho« rigkeitsgefu« hl, a feeling of belonging together. Such a feeling
may indeed depend in part on the degrees and forms of commonality
and connectedness, but it will also depend on other factors such as
particular events, their encoding in compelling public narratives, pre-
vailing discursive frames, and so on. Second, relational connectedness,
or what Tilly calls `̀ netness,'' while crucial in facilitating the sort of
collective action Tilly was interested in, is not always necessary for
`̀ groupness.''A strongly bounded sense of groupness may rest on cate-
gorical commonality and an associated feeling of belonging together
with minimal or no relational connectedness. This is typically the case
for large-scale collectivities such as ``nations'': when a di¡use self-
understanding as a member of a particular nation crystallizes into a
strongly bounded sense of groupness, this is likely to depend not on
relational connectedness, but rather on a powerfully imagined and
strongly felt commonality.76
The point is not, as some partisans of network theory have suggested,
to turn from commonality to connectedness, from categories to net-
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works, from shared attributes to social relations.77 Nor is it to celebrate
£uidity and hybridity over belonging and solidarity. The point in sug-
gesting this last set of terms is rather to develop an analytical idiom
sensitive to the multiple forms and degrees of commonality and con-
nectedness, and to the widely varying ways in which actors (and the
cultural idioms, public narratives, and prevailing discourses on which
they draw) attribute meaning and signi¢cance to them. This will enable
us to distinguish instances of strongly binding, vehemently felt groupness
from more loosely structured, weakly constraining forms of a¤nity
and a¤liation.
Three cases: ``Identity'' and its alternatives in context
Having surveyed the work done by `̀ identity,'' indicated some limita-
tions and liabilities of the term, and suggested a range of alternatives,
we seek now to illustrate our argument ^ both the critical claims about
`̀ identity'' and the constructive suggestions regarding alternative idioms
^ through a consideration of three cases. In each case, we suggest, the
identitarian focus on bounded groupness limits the sociological ^ and
the political ^ imagination, while alternative analytical idioms can
help open up both.
A case from Africanist anthropology: `̀ The'' Nuer
African studies has su¡ered from its version of identitarian thinking,
most extremely in journalistic accounts that see Africans' `̀ tribal iden-
tity'' as the main cause of violence and of the failure of the nation-state.
Academic Africanists have been troubled by this reductive vision of
Africa since at least the 1970s and attracted to a version of constructi-
vism, well before such an approach had a name.78 The argument that
ethnic groups are not primordial but the products of history ^ including
the reifying of cultural di¡erence through imposed colonial identi¢ca-
tions ^ became a staple of African studies. Even so, scholars tended to
emphasize boundary-formation rather than boundary crossing, the
constitution of groups rather than the development of networks.79 In
this context, it is worth going back to a classic of African ethnology:
E. E. Evans-Pritchard's bookThe Nuer.80
Based on research in Northeast Africa in the 1930s,The Nuer describes
a distinctively relational mode of identi¢cation, self-understanding,
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and social location, one that construes the social world in terms of the
degree and quality of connection among people rather than in terms of
categories, groups, or boundaries. Social location is de¢ned in the ¢rst
instance in terms of lineage, consisting of the descendants of one
ancestor reckoned through a socially conventional line: patrilineal,
via males in the case of Nuer, via females or more rarely via double
descent systems in other parts of Africa. Children belong to the lineage
of their fathers, and while relationships with the mother's kin are not
ignored, they are not part of the descent system. A segmentary lineage
can be diagrammed as in Figure 1.
Everybody in this diagram is related to everybody else, but in di¡erent
ways and to di¡erent degrees. One might be tempted to say that the
people marked in circle A constitute a group, with an `̀ identity'' of A,
as distinct from those in circle B, with an `̀ identity'' of B. The trouble
with such an interpretation is that the very move that distinguishes A
and B also shows their relatedness, as one moves back one generation
and ¢nds a common ancestor, who may or may not be living but whose
social location links people in A and B. If someone in set A gets into a
con£ict with someone in set B, such a person may well try to invoke the
commonality of `̀A-ness'' to mobilize people against B. But someone
genealogically older than these parties can invoke the linking ancestors
to cool things o¡. The act of going deeper in a genealogical chart in the
course of social interaction keeps reemphasizing relational visions of
social location at the expense of categorical ones.
One could argue that this patrilineage as a whole constitutes an iden-
tity, distinct from other lineages. But Evans-Pritchard's point is that
Figure 1. A segmentary patrilineage; lines represent descent; marriage partners come
from another lineage; children of daughters belong to the lineage of the husband and are
not shown; children of sons belong to this lineage and are represented here.
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segmentation represents an entire social order, and that lineages them-
selves are related to one another as male and female lineage members
are to each other. Then let us consider marriage.Virtually all segmen-
tary societies insist on exogamy; and, in evolutionary perspective, the
prevalence of exogamy may re£ect the advantages of cross-lineage
connectedness. So the male-centered lineage diagram presumes another
set of relationships, through women who are born into the lineage of
their fathers but whose sons and daughters belong to the lineage they
married into.
One could then argue that all the lineages that intermarried constitute
the ``Nuer'' as an identity distinct from ``Dinka'' or any of the other
groups in the region. But here recent work in African history o¡ers a
more nuanced approach. The genealogical construction of relationality
o¡ers possibilities for extension more supple than the twentieth-cen-
tury scholar's tendency to look for a neat boundary between inside and
outside. Marriage relations could be extended beyond the Nuer (both
via reciprocal arrangements and coercively by forcing captive women
into marriage). Strangers ^ encountered via trade, migration, or other
forms of movement ^ could be incorporated as ¢ctive kin or more
loosely linked to a patrilineage via blood brotherhood. The people of
northeastern Africa migrated extensively, as they tried to ¢nd better
ecological niches or as lineage segments moved in and out of relations
with each other. Traders stretched their kinship relations over space,
formed a variety of relationships at the interfaces with agricultural
communities, and sometimes developed lingua franca to foster com-
munication across large spatial networks.81 In many parts of Africa,
one ¢nds certain organizations ^ religious shrines, initiation societies
^ that cross linguistic and cultural distinctions, o¡ering what Paul
Richards calls a `̀ common `grammar' '' of social experience within
regions, for all the cultural variation and political di¡erentiation that
they contain.82
The problem with subsuming these forms of relational connectedness
under the ``social construction of identity'' is that linking and separating
get called by the same name, making it harder to grasp the processes,
causes, and consequences of di¡ering patterns of crystallizing di¡erence
and forging connections. Africa was far from a paradise of sociability,
but war and peace both involved £exible patterns of a¤liation as well
as di¡erentiation.
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One should not assume that the principles of a sliding scale of connec-
tion are unique to small-scale `̀ tribal'' society.We know from the study of
larger-scale political organizations ^ with authoritative rulers and
elaborate hierarchies of command ^ that kinship networks remained an
important principle of social life. African kings asserted their authority
by developing patrimonial relations with people from di¡erent lineages,
creating a core of support that cross cut lineage a¤liations, but they
also used lineage principles to consolidate their own power, cementing
marriage alliances and expanding the size of the royal lineage.83 In
almost all societies, kinship concepts are symbolic and ideological
resources, yet while they shape norms, self-understandings, and percep-
tions of a¤nity, they do not necessarily produce kinship `̀ groups.''84
To a greater extent than the forms of domination that preceded it,
colonial rule attempted a one-to-one mapping of people with some
putatively common characteristic onto territory. These imposed iden-
ti¢cations could be powerful, but their e¡ects depended on the actual
relationships and symbolic systems that colonial o¤cials ^ and in-
digenous cultural entrepreneurs as well ^ had to work with, and on
countervailing e¡orts of others to maintain, develop, and articulate
di¡erent sorts of a¤nities and self-understandings. The colonial era
did indeed witness complex struggles over identi¢cation, but it £attens
our understanding of these struggles to see them as producing `̀ identi-
ties.'' People could live with shadings ^ and continued to do so day-by-
day even when political lines were drawn.
Sharon Hutchinson's remarkable reanalysis of Evans-Pritchard's ``tribe''
takes such an argument into a contemporary, con£ict-ridden situation.
Her aim is ``to call into question the very idea of `the Nuer' as a uni¢ed
ethnic identity.''85 She points to the fuzziness of the boundaries of
people now called Nuer: culture and history do not follow such lines.
And she suggests that Evans-Pritchard's segmentary schema gives ex-
cessive attention to the dominant male elders of the 1930s, and not
enough to women, men in less powerful lineages, or younger men and
women. In this analysis, it not only becomes di¤cult to see Nuerness
as an identity, but imperative to examine with precision how people
tried both to extend and to consolidate connections. Bringing the story
up to the era of civil war in the southern Sudan in the 1990s, Hutchinson
refuses to reduce the con£ict to one of cultural or religious di¡erence
between the warring parties and insists instead on a deep analysis of
political relationships, struggles for economic resources, and spatial
connections.
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In much of modern Africa, indeed, some of the most bitter con£icts
have taken place within collectivities that are relatively uniform cul-
turally and linguistically (Rwanda, Somalia) and between loose eco-
nomic and social networks based more on patron-client relations than
ethnic a¤liation (Angola, Sierra Leone), as well as in situations where
cultural distinction has been made into a political weapon (Kwa Zulu
in South Africa).86 To explain present or past con£ict in terms of how
people construct and ¢ght for their ``identities'' risks providing a pre-
fabricated, presentist, teleological explanation that diverts attention
from questions such as those addressed by Hutchinson.
East European nationalism
We have argued that the language of identity, with its connotations of
boundedness, groupness, and sameness, is conspicuously ill suited to
the analysis of segmentary lineage societies ^ or of present-day con-
£icts in Africa. One might accept this point yet argue that identitarian
language is well suited to the analysis of other social settings, including
our own, where public and private `̀ identity talk'' is widely current. But
we are not arguing only that the concept of identity does not `̀ travel''
well, that it cannot be universally applied to all social settings.We want
to make a stronger argument: that ``identity'' is neither necessary nor
helpful as a category of analysis even where it is widely used as a
category of practice. To this end, we brie£y consider East European
nationalism and identity politics in the United States.
Historical and social scienti¢c writing on nationalism in Eastern
Europe ^ to a much greater extent than writing on social movements
or ethnicity in North America ^ has been characterized by relatively
strong or hard understandings of group identity. Many commentators
have seen the post-communist resurgence of ethnic nationalism in the
region as springing from robust and deeply rooted national identities ^
from identities strong and resilient enough to have survived decades
of repression by ruthlessly antinational communist regimes. But this
`̀ return-of-the-repressed'' view is problematic.87
Consider the former Soviet Union. To see national con£icts as struggles
to validate and express identities that had somehow survived the regime's
attempts to crush them is unwarranted. Although antinationalist, and
of course brutally repressive in all kinds of ways, the Soviet regime was
anything but anti-national.88 Far from ruthlessly suppressing nation-
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hood, the regime went to unprecedented lengths in institutionalizing
and codifying it. It carved up Soviet territory into more than ¢fty
putatively autonomous national `̀ homelands,'' each `̀ belonging'' to a
particular ethnonational group; and it assigned each citizen an ethnic
`̀ nationality,'' which was ascribed at birth on the basis of descent,
registered in personal identity documents, recorded in bureaucratic
encounters, and used to control access to higher education and employ-
ment. In doing so, the regime was not simply recognizing or ratifying a
pre-existing state of a¡airs; it was newly constituting both persons and
places as national.89 In this context, strong understandings of national
identity as deeply rooted in the pre-communist history of the region,
frozen or repressed by a ruthlessly antinational regime, and returning
with the collapse of communism are at best anachronistic, at worst
simply scholarly rationalizations of nationalist rhetoric.
What about weak, constructivist understandings of identity? Con-
structivists might concede the importance of the Soviet system of
institutionalized multinationality, and interpret this as the institutional
means through which national identities were constructed. But why
should we assume it is `̀ identity'' that is constructed in this fashion? To
assume that it is risks con£ating a system of identi¢cation or categoriza-
tion with its presumed result, identity. Categorical group denominations
^ however authoritative, however pervasively institutionalized ^ cannot
serve as indicators of real `̀ groups'' or robust `̀ identities.''
Consider for example the case of `̀ Russians'' in Ukraine. At the time
of the 1989 census, some 11.4 million residents of Ukraine identi¢ed
their `̀ nationality'' as Russian. But the precision suggested by this
census datum, even when rounded to the nearest hundred thousand, is
entirely spurious. The very categories `̀ Russian'' and ``Ukrainian,'' as
designators of putatively distinct ethnocultural nationalities, or dis-
tinct `̀ identities,'' are deeply problematic in the Ukrainian context,
where rates of intermarriage have been high, and where millions of
nominal Ukrainians speak only or primarily Russian. One should be
skeptical of the illusion of `̀ identity'' or bounded groupness created by
the census, with its exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories. One
can imagine circumstances in which `̀ groupness'' might emerge among
nominal Russians in Ukraine, but such groupness cannot be taken as
given.90
The formal institutionalization and codi¢cation of ethnic and national
categories implies nothing about the depth, resonance, or power of such
26
categories in the lived experience of the persons so categorized. A
strongly institutionalized ethnonational classi¢catory system makes
certain categories readily and legitimately available for the representa-
tion of social reality, the framing of political claims, and the organiza-
tion of political action. This is itself a fact of great signi¢cance, and the
breakup of the Soviet Union cannot be understood without reference
to it. But it does not entail that these categories will have a signi¢cant
role in framing perception, orienting action, or shaping self-under-
standing in everyday life ^ a role that is implied by even constructivist
accounts of `̀ identity.''
The extent to which o¤cial categorizations shape self-understandings,
the extent to which the population-categories constituted by states or
political entrepreneurs approximate real ``groups'' ^ these are open
questions that can only be addressed empirically. The language of
`̀ identity'' is more likely to hinder than to help the posing of such
questions, for it blurs what needs to be kept distinct: external catego-
rization and self-understanding, objective commonality and subjective
groupness.
Consider one ¢nal, non-Soviet example. The boundary between Hun-
garians and Romanians in Transylvania is certainly sharper than that
between Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine. Here too, however,
group boundaries are considerably more porous and ambiguous than
is widely assumed. The language of both politics and everyday life, to
be sure, is rigorously categorical, dividing the population into mutually
exclusive ethnonational categories, and making no allowance for mixed
or ambiguous forms. But this categorical code, important though it is
as a constituent element of social relations, should not be taken for a
faithful description of them. Reinforced by identitarian entrepreneurs
on both sides, the categorical code obscures as much as it reveals about
self-understandings, masking the £uidity and ambiguity that arise from
mixed marriages, from bilingualism, from migration, from Hungarian
children attending Romanian-language schools, from intergenerational
assimilation (in both directions), and ^ perhaps most important ^ from
sheer indi¡erence to the claims of ethnocultural nationality.
Even in its constructivist guise, the language of `̀ identity'' disposes us
to think in terms of bounded groupness. It does so because even con-
structivist thinking on identity takes the existence of identity as axio-
matic. Identity is always already `̀ there,'' as something that individuals
and groups ``have,'' even if the content of particular identities, and the
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boundaries that mark groups o¡ from one another, are conceptualized
as always in £ux. Even constructivist language tends therefore to ob-
jectify `̀ identity,'' to treat it as a ``thing,'' albeit a malleable one, that
people `̀ have,'' `̀ forge,'' and `̀ construct.''
This tendency to objectify ``identity'' deprives us of analytical leverage.
It makes it more di¤cult for us to treat `̀ groupness'' and `̀ bounded-
ness'' as emergent properties of particular structural or conjunctural
settings rather than as always already there in some form. The point
needs to be emphasized today more than ever, for the unre£ectively
groupist language that prevails in everyday life, journalism, politics,
and much social research as well ^ the habit of speaking without
quali¢cation of `Àlbanians'' and `̀ Serbs,'' for example, as if they were
sharply bounded, internally homogeneous ``groups'' ^ not only weakens
social analysis but constricts political possibilities in the region.
Identity claims and the enduring dilemmas of `̀ race'' in the United States
The language of identity has been particularly powerful in the United
States in recent decades. It has been prominent both as an idiom of
analysis in the social sciences and humanities and as an idiom in which
to articulate experience, mobilize loyalty, and formulate symbolic and
material claims in everyday social and political practice.
The pathos and resonance of identity claims in the contemporary
United States have many sources, but one of the most profound is that
central problem of American history ^ the importation of enslaved
Africans, the persistence of racial oppression, and the range of African-
American responses to it. The African-American experience of ``race''
as both imposed categorization and self-identi¢cation has been impor-
tant not only in its own terms, but from the late 1960s on as a template
for identity claims of all sorts, including those based on gender and
sexual orientation as well as those based on `̀ ethnicity'' or `̀ race.''91
In response to the cascading identitarian claims of the last three
decades, public discourse, political argument, and scholarship in
nearly every ¢eld of the social sciences and humanities have been
transformed. There is much that is valuable in this process. History
textbooks and prevailing public narratives tell a much richer and more
inclusive story than those of a generation ago. Specious forms of
universalism ^ the Marxist category of `̀ worker'' who always appears
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in the guise of a male, the liberal category of `̀ citizen'' who turns out to
be white ^ have been powerfully exposed. ``First-generation'' identitarian
claims themselves ^ and scholarly literatures informed by them ^ have
been criticized for their blindness to cross-cutting particularities: Afri-
can-American movements for acting as if African-American women
did not have gender-speci¢c concerns, feminists for focusing on white,
middle-class women.
Constructivist arguments have had a particular in£uence in Ameri-
canist circles, allowing scholars to stress the contemporary importance
of imposed identi¢cations and the self-understandings that have
evolved in dialectical interplay with them, while emphasizing that such
self- and other-identi¢ed `̀ groups'' are not primordial but historically
produced. The treatment of race in the historiography of the United
States is an excellent example.92 Even before ``social construction'' be-
came a buzz-word, scholars were showing that far from being a given
dimension of America's past, race as a political category originated in
the same moment as America's republican and populist impulses.
Edmund Morgan argued that in early eighteenth-century Virginia,
white indentured servants and black slaves shared a subordination
that was not sharply di¡erentiated; they sometimes acted together.
It was when Virginian planter elites started to mobilize against the
British that they needed to draw a sharp boundary between the politi-
cally included and the excluded, and the fact that black slaves were
more numerous and replaceable as laborers and less plausible as
political supporters led to a marking of distinction, which poor whites
could in turn use to make claims.93 From such an opening, historians
have charted several key moments of rede¢nition of racial boundaries
in the United States ^ and several points at which other sorts of ties
showed the possibility of giving rise to other kinds of political a¤lia-
tion. Whiteness and blackness were both historically created and his-
torically variable categories. Comparative historians, meanwhile, have
shown that the construction of race can take still more varied forms,
showing that many people who were `̀ black'' under North American
classi¢catory systems would have been something else in other parts of
the Americas.94
American history thus reveals the power of imposed identi¢cation, but
it also reveals the complexity of the self-understandings of people
de¢ned by circumstances they did not control. Pre-Civil War collective
self-de¢nitions situated black Americans in particular ways in regard
to Africa ^ often seeing an African (or an `̀ Ethiopian'') origin as
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placing them close to the heartlands of Christian civilization. Yet early
back-to-Africa movements often treated Africa as a cultural tabula
rasa or as a fallen civilization to be redeemed by African-American
Christians.95 Asserting oneself as a diasporic ``people'' did not neces-
sarily imply claiming cultural commonality ^ the two concepts have
been in tension with each other ever since. One can write the history
of African-American self-understanding as the ``rise'' over time of a
black nationality, or one can explore the interplay of such a sense of
collectivity with the e¡orts of African-American activists to articulate
di¡erent kinds of political ideologies and to develop connections with
other radicals. The most important point is to consider the range of
possibilities and the seriousness with which they were debated.
It is not the historical analysis of social construction as such that is
problematic, but the presumptions about what it is that is constructed.
It is ``whiteness'' or `̀ race'' that is taken as the typical object of con-
struction, not other, looser forms of a¤nity and commonality. Setting
out to write about `̀ identi¢cations'' as they emerge, crystallize, and
fade away in particular social and political circumstances may well
inspire a rather di¡erent history than setting out to write of an `̀ iden-
tity,'' which links past, present, and future in a single word.
Cosmopolitan interpretations of American history have been criticized
for taking the pain out of the distinct ways in which that history has
been experienced: above all the pain of enslavement and discrimina-
tion, and of struggle against enslavement and discrimination, a history
that marks African Americans in ways that white Americans do not
share.96 Here is where calls for the understanding of the particularity
of experience resonate powerfully, but it is also here that the dangers
of £attening those histories into a static and singular `̀ identity'' are
serious. There may be gains as well as losses in such a £attening, as
thoughtful participants in debates over the politics of race have made
clear.97 But to subsume further under the generic category of `̀ iden-
tity'' the historical experiences and allegedly common `̀ cultures'' of
other `̀ groups'' as disparate as women and the elderly, Native Ameri-
cans and gay men, poor people and the disabled is not in any obvious
way more respectful of the pain of particular histories than are the
universalist rhetorics of justice or human rights. And the assignment
of individuals to such `̀ identities'' leaves many people ^ who have
experienced the uneven trajectories of ancestry and the variety of
innovations and adaptations that constitute culture ^ caught between
a hard identity that doesn't quite ¢t and a soft rhetoric of hybridity,
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multiplicity, and £uidity that o¡ers neither understanding nor solace.98
The question remains whether we can address the complexity of history
^ including the changing ways in which external categorizations have
both stigmatized and humiliated people and given them an enabling
and empowering sense of collective selfhood ^ in more supple and
di¡erentiated language. If the real contribution of constructivist social
analysis ^ that a¤nities, categories, and subjectivities develop and
change over time ^ is to be taken seriously, and not reduced to a
presentist, teleological account of the construction of currently exist-
ing ``groups,'' then bounded groupness must be understood as a con-
tingent, emergent property, not an axiomatic given.
Representing contemporary American society poses a similar problem
^ avoiding £at, reductive accounts of the social world as a multichrome
mosaic of monochrome identity groups. This conceptually impoverished
identitarian sociology, in which the `̀ intersection'' of race, class, gender,
sexual orientation, and perhaps one or two other categories generates a
set of all-purpose conceptual boxes, has become powerful in American
academia in the 1990s ^ not only in the social sciences, cultural studies,
and ethnic studies, but also in literature and political philosophy. In
the remainder of this section, we shift our angle of vision and consider
the implications of the use of this identitarian sociology in the latter
domain.
`̀A moral philosophy,'' wrote Alisdair MacIntyre, `̀ presupposes a sociol-
ogy'';99 the same holds a fortiori of political theory. The problem with
much contemporary political theory is that it is built on questionable
sociology ^ indeed precisely on the group-centered representation of
the social world just mentioned. We are not taking the side of `̀ uni-
versality'' against ``particularity'' here. Rather, we are suggesting that
the identitarian language and groupist social ontology that informs
much contemporary political theory occludes the problematic nature
of `̀ groupness'' itself and forecloses other ways of conceptualizing
particular a¤liations and a¤nities.
There is a considerable literature now that is critical of the idea of
universal citizenship. Iris MarionYoung, one of the most in£uential of
such critics, proposes instead an ideal of group-di¡erentiated citizen-
ship, built on group representation and group rights. The notion of an
`̀ impartial general perspective,'' she argues, `̀ is a myth.'' Di¡erent
social groups have di¡erent needs, cultures, histories, experiences, and
perceptions of social relations.'' Citizenship should not seek to tran-
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scend such di¡erences, but should recognize and acknowledge them as
`̀ irreducible.''100
What sort of di¡erences should be rati¢ed with special representation
and rights? The di¡erences in question are those associated with ``so-
cial groups,'' de¢ned as ``comprehensive identities and ways of life,'' and
distinguished from mere aggregates on the one hand ^ arbitrary clas-
si¢cations of persons according to some attribute ^ and from volun-
tary associations on the other. Special rights and representation would
be accorded not to all social groups, but to those who su¡er from at
least one of ¢ve forms of oppression. In contemporary American
society, this means ``women, blacks, Native Americans, Chicanos,
Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speaking Americans, Asian Ameri-
cans, gay men, lesbians, working-class people, old people, and men-
tally and physically disabled people.''101
What constitutes the `̀ groupness'' of these `̀ groups?'' What makes
them groups rather than categories around which self- and other-iden-
ti¢cations may but certainly do not necessarily or always crystallize?
This is not addressed byYoung. She assumes that distinctive histories,
experiences, and social location endow these `̀ groups'' with di¡erent
`̀ capacities, needs, culture, and cognitive styles'' and with `̀ distinctive
understandings of all aspects of the society and unique perspectives on
social issues.''102 Social and cultural heterogeneity is construed here as
a juxtaposition of internally homogeneous, externally bounded blocs.
The `̀ principles of unity'' that Young repudiates at the level of the
polity as a whole ^ because they `̀ hide di¡erence'' ^ are reintroduced,
and continue to hide di¡erence, at the level of the constituent `̀ groups.''
At stake in arguments about group-di¡erentiated or `̀ multicultural''
citizenship are important issues that have been long debated outside as
well as inside the academy, all having to do in one way or another with
the relative weight and merits of universalist and particularist
claims.103 Sociological analysis cannot and should not seek to resolve
this robust debate, but it can seek to shore up its often shaky socio-
logical foundations. It can o¡er a richer vocabulary for conceptualiz-
ing social and cultural heterogeneity and particularity. Moving beyond
identitarian language opens up possibilities for specifying other kinds
of connectedness, other idioms of identi¢cation, other styles of self-
understanding, other ways of reckoning social location. To paraphrase
what Adam Przeworsky said long ago about class, cultural struggle is a
struggle about culture before it is a struggle among cultures.104 Acti-
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vists of identity politics deploy the language of bounded groupness not
because it re£ects social reality, but precisely because groupness is
ambiguous and contested. Their groupist rhetoric has a performative,
constitutive dimension, contributing, when it is successful, to the making
of the groups it invokes.105
Here we have a gap between normative arguments and activist idioms
that take bounded groupness as axiomatic and historical and socio-
logical analyses that emphasize contingency, £uidity, and variability.
At one level there is a real-life dilemma: preserving cultural distinctive-
ness depends at least in part on maintaining bounded groupness and
hence on policing the ``exit option,'' and accusations of `̀ passing'' and
of betraying one's roots serve as modes of discipline.106 Critics of such
policing, however, would argue that a liberal polity should protect
individuals from the oppressiveness of social groups as well as that of
the state. At the level of social analysis, though, the dilemma is not a
necessary one.We are not faced with a stark choice between a univer-
salist, individualist analytical idiom and an identitarian, groupist idiom.
Framing the options in this way misses the variety of forms (other than
bounded groups) that a¤nity, commonality, and connectedness can
take ^ hence our emphasis on the need for a more supple vocabulary.
We are not arguing for any speci¢c stance on the politics of cultural
distinction and individual choice, but rather for a vocabulary of social
analysis that helps open up and illuminate the range of options. The
politics of group `̀ coalition'' that is celebrated by Young and others,
for example, certainly has its place, but the groupist sociology that
underlies this particular form of coalition politics ^ with its assump-
tion that bounded groups are the basic building blocks of political
alliances ^ constricts the political imagination.107
None of this belies the importance of current debates over `̀ universal-
istic'' and ``particularistic'' conceptions of social justice. Our point is
that the identitarian focus on bounded groupness does not help in
posing these questions; the debate is in some respects based on mis-
conceptions on both sides. We need not in fact choose between an
American history £attened into the experiences and `̀ cultures'' of
bounded groups and one equally £attened into a single `̀ national''
story. Reducing the heterogeneity of American society and history to
a multichrome mosaic of monochrome identity groups hinders rather
than helps the work of understanding the past and pursuing social
justice in the present.
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Conclusion: Particularity and the politics of ``identity''
We have not made an argument about identity politics. Nonetheless,
the argument does have political as well as intellectual implications. In
some circles, these will be thought to be regressive, to undermine the
basis for making particularistic claims. That is neither our intention
nor a valid inference from what we have written.
To persuade people that they are one; that they comprise a bounded,
distinctive, solidary group; that their internal di¡erences do not matter,
at least for the purpose at hand ^ this is a normal and necessary part
of politics, and not only of what is ordinarily characterized as ``identity
politics.'' It is not all of politics; and we do indeed have reservations
about the way in which the routine recourse to identitarian framing
may foreclose other equally important ways of framing political
claims. But we do not seek to deprive anyone of `̀ identity'' as a political
tool, or to undermine the legitimacy of making political appeals in
identitarian terms.
Our argument has focused, rather, on the use of `̀ identity'' as an ana-
lytical concept. Throughout the article, we have asked what work the
concept is supposed to do, and how well it does it.We have argued that
the concept is deployed to do a great deal of analytical work ^ much of
it legitimate and important. ``Identity,'' however, is ill suited to perform
this work, for it is riddled with ambiguity, riven with contradictory
meanings, and encumbered by reifying connotations. Qualifying the
noun with strings of adjectives ^ specifying that identity is multiple,
£uid, constantly re-negotiated, and so on ^ does not solve the Orwel-
lian problem of entrapment in a word. It yields little more than a
suggestive oxymoron ^ a multiple singularity, a £uid crystallization ^
but still begs the question of why one should use the same term to
designate all this and more. Alternative analytical idioms, we have
argued, can do the necessary work without the attendant confusion.
At issue here is not the legitimacy or importance of particularistic
claims, but how best to conceptualize them. People everywhere and
always have particular ties, self-understandings, stories, trajectories,
histories, predicaments. And these inform the sorts of claims they
make. To subsume such pervasive particularity under the £at, undif-
ferentiated rubric of `̀ identity,'' however, does nearly as much violence
to its unruly and multifarious forms as would an attempt to subsume it
under ``universalist'' categories such as `̀ interest.''
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Construing particularity in identitarian terms, moreover, constricts
the political as well as the analytical imagination. It points away from
a range of possibilities for political action other than those rooted in
putatively shared identity ^ and not only those that are praised or
damned as ``universalist.'' Identitarian political advocates, for example,
construe political cooperation in terms of the building of coalitions
between bounded identity groups. This is one mode of political coopera-
tion, but not the only one.
Kathryn Sikkink and Margaret Keck, for example, have drawn atten-
tion to the importance of `̀ transnational issue networks,'' from the
antislavery movement of the early nineteenth century to international
campaigns about human rights, ecology, and women's rights in recent
years. Such networks necessarily cross cultural as well as state boun-
daries and link particular places and particularistic claims to wider
concerns. To take one instance, the antiapartheid movement brought
together South African political organizations that were themselves far
from united ^ some sharing `̀ universalist'' ideologies, some calling
themselves `Àfricanist,'' some asserting a quite local, culturally de¢ned
`̀ identity'' ^ with international church groups, labor unions, pan-Afri-
can movements for racial solidarity, human rights groups, and so on.
Particular groups moved in and out of cooperative arrangements with-
in an overall network; con£ict among opponents of the apartheid state
was sometimes bitter, even deadly. As the actors in the network shifted,
the issues at stake were reframed. At certain moments, for example,
issues amenable to international mobilization were highlighted, while
others ^ of great concern to some would-be participants ^ were margi-
nalized.108
Our point is not to celebrate such networks over more exclusively
identitarian social movements or group-based claims. Networks are
no more intrinsically virtuous than identitarian movements and
groups are intrinsically suspect. Politics ^ in Southern Africa or else-
where ^ is hardly a confrontation of good universalists or good net-
works versus bad tribalists. Much havoc has been done by £exible
networks built on clientage and focused on pillage and smuggling;
such networks have sometimes been linked to `̀ principled'' political
organizations; and they have often been connected to arms and illegal
merchandise brokers in Europe, Asia, and North America. Multi-
farious particularities are in play, and one needs to distinguish between
situations where they cohere around particular cultural symbols and
situations where they are £exible, pragmatic, readily extendable. It
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does not contribute to precision of analysis to use the same words for
the extremes of rei¢cation and £uidity, and everything in between.
To criticize the use of `̀ identity'' in social analysis is not to blind
ourselves to particularity. It is rather to conceive of the claims and
possibilities that arise from particular a¤nities and a¤liations, from
particular commonalities and connections, from particular stories and
self-understandings, from particular problems and predicaments in a
more di¡erentiated manner. Social analysis has become massively, and
durably, sensitized to particularity in recent decades; and the literature
on identity has contributed valuably to this enterprise. It is time now to
go beyond `̀ identity'' ^ not in the name of an imagined universalism,
but in the name of the conceptual clarity required for social analysis
and political understanding alike.
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